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1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a known fact that prevention is always better than control but traditionally safety measures 
within the field of engineering is usually applied to control the hazards rather than reducing 
them. This approach based on controlling a hazard is often referred to as ‘extrinsic safety’ as 
opposed to the approach of reducing the presence of a hazard, which is called ‘inherent safety’15. 
   The concept of inherent safety comes from theories formulated by Trevor Kletz, in his article, 
entitled “What You Don’t Have, Can’t Leak. Years later in 1991, Mr. Kletz published a more 
updated version of his studies titled “Plant Design for Safety – A User-Friendly Approach”, 
which gave rise to the modern concepts of inherent safety. Inherently safer design has been 
advocated since the explosion at Flixborough in 1974, which raised a lot of question about safety 
in chemical plants. 
   As mentioned earlier an inherently safer design is one that avoids hazards instead of 
controlling them, particularly by removing or reducing the amount of hazardous material in the 
plant or the number of hazardous operations21. Hazards can be reduced or eliminated by 
changing the materials, chemistry, and process variables such that the reduced hazard is 
characteristic of the new conditions and such a process with reduced hazards is described as 
inherently safer. Inherent safety recognizes there is no chemical process that is without risk, but 
all chemical processes can be made safer by applying inherently safer concepts. Therefore in 
order to reduce the hazards we need to be able to understand the various concepts of inherent 
safety, more commonly called ‘inherently safer design strategies’21. The inherently safer design 
strategies have been grouped into four major strategies: 
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1. Intensification: Using smaller quantities of hazardous substances. 
2. Substitution: Replacing a material or a process with a less hazardous one. 
3. Simplification: Designing facilities which eliminate unnecessary complexity. 
4. Attenuation: Facilities which minimize the impact of a hazardous release. 
 
2. TRANSITION TOWARDS INHERENT SAFETY 
In the past, the concept of extrinsic safety has been widely used, which focuses on how to control 
a hazard in the event of an accident. This practice mainly involves adding layers of protection 
around a hazardous system, hence when something happens the safety systems in place are 
expected contain the problem. But this is not always the case, because in the past we have seen 
safety systems failing at crucial times, like during the Bhopal Tragedy14. Even though this may 
seem like a good approach towards safer operations, it ignores the main cause of all safety 
practices that in place today, the hazards itself. Rather than focusing on ways to eliminate the 
problem, this approach just focuses on how to mitigate the consequences.  
   The transition from traditional practices to inherently safer practices has been a slow process. It 
was only after the Flixborough accident in 1974 and the Seveso disaster in 1976, due to which 
people began to re-consider the traditional approach to safety. People began to accept the 
concept of ‘inherent safety’ as proposed by Dr. Kletz in the 1970’s, and tried to incorporate some 
of his theories. The final step in the transition came in 1996 when the Eurpian Union passed the 
‘Seveso II’ Directive. The ‘Seveso II’ Directive (96/82/EC) was aimed at the prevention of the 
major accident hazards involving dangerous substances, and the limitation of their consequences 
for man and the environment, with a view to ensuring high levels of protection throughout the 
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community in a consistent and effective manner. As a part of the prevention measures the 
directive clearly stated that “Hazards should be possibly avoided or reduced at source through 
the application of inherently safe practices”19.  
   Nowadays, the safety approach is based around inherent safety, using its concepts as the 
primary safety measures. The traditional approach is now applied as a secondary safety measure, 
to reinforce the overall safety of a process. This insures that if an inherently safer process goes 
out of hand, a secondary safety system is in place to control the consequences. Together inherent 
safety and extrinsic safety form what is known as a ‘Layer of Protection’ around a hazard, 
making sure nothing hopefully goes wrong. This relationship between the two is shown in the 
figure below: 
 
 
Fig. 1: Layers of Protection around a system 
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3.  INHERENT SAFETY 
An inherently safer process or chemical relies on various engineering principles like physics, 
chemistry and math, to prevent accidents from happening rather than focusing on control systems 
and measures to contain the accident. The major components of inherent safety that were 
outlines earlier will now be discussed in detail. Examples will be provided showing how these 
principles have been applied to various processes and chemicals today. 
3.1 INTENSIFICATION 
Intensification aims to eliminate or reduce the presence of hazardous inventories in plants. This 
reduction can be done on the inventory of different process units such as the storage tanks, 
reactors, distillation units and pipelines. Moreover, intensification is being applied more and 
more in the process industry because of its economic profitability; smaller plants require less 
capital to initiate, maintain, control and are safer. Inventory intensification will be discussed for 
two different process unit reactors and storage tanks. 
1. REACTORS 
There are two main reasons for having large inventories in reactors- the slow rate and/or 
the low conversion of the reaction.  Slow reactions will take a large amount of time to 
yield the desired product, but increasing the inventory will yield more products within the 
same amount of time. As for low conversion, most of the output is recycled back to the 
reactor leading to the presence of a high inventory in the system1.  
For some reactions, the low conversion and slow rate are not intrinsic to the reaction but 
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result from bad design choices, for example poor mixing or operating the process at 
pressure and temperature conditions that will slow the reaction. These can be resolved 
through better understanding of the process and accordingly designing the unit to give a 
higher yield. This should be done in the initial design stages because once the process is 
set up not a lot of changes, in most cases, could be done.  But to keep the process safe, 
more add-ons are going to be needed to control the system, a high hazardous inventory 
which leads to more redundant safety system.  
Nitroglycerin production  
Nitroglycerin, an explosive liquid, is obtained by mixing glycerin with concentrated nitric 
and sulfuric acid. The reaction is very exothermic and necessitates constant cooling to 
prevent the heating of the explosive Nitroglycerin. The reaction has been conducted 
“traditionally in large stirred pot reactor batchwise containing about one tone of 
material”1. The low reaction conversion necessitates the presence of a large inventory 
which constitutes a dangerous hazard. This requires a good amount of add-ons such as 
cooling system, relief valves, temperature and pressure controllers1.  
   Engineers working on the Nitroglycerin production found out that the slow rate of the 
reaction is not caused by the intrinsic kinetics of the reaction but rather by the poor stirred 
mixing that is happening in the batch reactor, which is an example of poor design. 
Following a better understanding of the nature of the reaction and the process, a well 
mixed continuous reactor was proposed instead. This new reactor needs around 1 Kg of 
inventory compared to the tone required for the batch process1. This inherently safer 
practice reduced the hazard present on-site and reduced the need for many process add-
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ons. Continuous reactors, in general, are now being suggested in guidelines as safer 
reactors compared to the batch reactor3. 
 
 
 
                              Fig. 2: The effect of varying conditions in liquid phase reactor 
 
11 
 
 
 
2. STORAGE TANKS 
Storage tank inventories constitute the greatest hazard for explosions in plants because 
they contain the largest amount of inventory present in plants. These tanks could store 
reactants, intermediate products or any other sort of material needed in the process. 
   An example of a storage tank inventory reduction was done by a US company that was 
storing 120,000 ton of Methyl IsoCyanate, the fluid that leaked during the Bhopal 
incident. This was done by processing MIC at a larger rate and storing the less hazardous 
final product instead MIC; by this new engineering design the plant became inherently 
safer1. 
    For this case, the solution was straightforward and required a better engineering design 
but in many other instances the solution might lay in better inventory management such 
as decreasing the time needed for the inventory shipment arrival in order to maintain the 
required production while having less storage tank inventory2. 
 
3.2 SIMPLIFICATION 
While plants in the chemical industry will always contain certain complexities that are intrinsic 
to the system; simplification aims to eliminate or reduce unnecessary complexities. Simpler 
plants have less equipment that could develop faults such as leakage and fewer opportunities for 
error such as human errors or control instrumentation error1,9. Simplification can be summarized 
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in the words of the founder of inherent safety” equipment you don’t install cannot develop faults 
or be operated at the wrong time or in the wrong way” 
Stronger equipments instead of relief systems 
 In order to minimize the effect of failures in equipments, relief valves are used10. Generally, the 
substances being handled are not discharged to the atmosphere because of environmental, safety 
and health concerns, but rather to a proper disposal system such as a flare system for flammable 
gas or scrubber system for solids. Relief systems are expensive, quite complex and will need to 
be continually maintained; moreover these systems are prone to error, which is the case of every 
system, the problem is that since these equipments are only used in emergency situation, the 
errors might be hidden and failure could occur in an emergency situation. A simpler solution that 
is cheaper and less prone to errors would be to use strong equipments that can contain the 
maximum or minimum pressure conditions within the system1,11,12. For example1, when pressure 
drop exists between vessels that are in series, as shown in the figure bellow, then if a failure 
happens, the valves will fail open resulting in a high upstream pressure in the downstream 
vessels.  
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Fig. 3: Vessels in series 
 
In order to prevent the downstream vessels from being exposed to this excess pressure, relief 
valves are used to discharge the fluid from the system10.  The simpler solution would be to 
construct the vessels from a strong material that could withhold the maximum excess pressure; 
then the relief system won’t be needed anymore and the possibility of error is eliminated.  
 
3.3 SUBSTITUTION 
It is the concept of inherent safety that involves replacement of a substance or a process which 
reduces or eliminates the hazards associated with it. For example, It could involve replacing a 
chemical with a less hazardous substance or replacing a process route with one which has a 
fewer number of associated hazards. Over the years with the development of new technology and 
processes, older and more hazardous processes or chemicals have been abandoned in favor of 
newer and safer approaches. In order to properly explain the concept, here are a few examples 
showing how processes have become safer by substituting dangerous substances and processes 
with something inherently safer. Listed below are a few areas in the chemical industry where the 
principle of substitution has been employed: 
  
1. REACTION CHEMISTRY: A lot of chemical engineering processes involve 
numerous complex reactions which make use of highly toxic chemicals. Thus with 
the use of less hazardous materials and chemical reactions with safer chemicals offers 
the great potential for improving inherent safety in the chemical industry. Here are 
some examples: 
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a. Acetonitrile manufacture: Back in the day, acetonitrile was manufactured using 
acetylene and hydrogen cyanide.  
                                CH≡CH + HCN  CH2=CHCN 
As we all know cyanide is as a highly toxic compound because it halts respiratory 
functions of the body cause by the cyanide ion. In order to reduce the risks 
involved, an alternative route is being used to manufacture acetonitrile using an 
ammoxidation process involving propylene and ammonia21. Here is the related 
reaction: 
CH2=CHCH3 + NH3 + (3/2)O2  CH2=CHCN + 3H2O 
 
b. Bhopal Disaster:  The bhopal disaster was the worst ever chemical disaster in the 
world. It resulted from the release of a very toxic gas Methyl-Iso-Cyanate (MIC), 
which is a reaction intermediate in the formation of Carbaryl. Here is the 
associated reaction, where methylamine (1) reacts with phosgene (2) to form 
methyl isocyanate (MIC) (3).  MIC then reacts  with 1-naphthol (4) to give 
Carbaryl (5): 
 
Fig. 4: Reaction mechanism to form Carbaryl using MIC as an intermediate 
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   Due to what happened in Bhopal, the reaction to form Carbaryl has now been 
replaced with a new safer reaction involving less toxic components21. The new 
reaction involves reacting 1-naphthol (1) with phosgene (2) in NaOH to create 
chloroformate (3), which then reacts further with methylamine to give the desired 
product Carbaryl (4). The reaction is shown below: 
 
Fig. 5: Alternate reaction mechanism to form Carbaryl 
 
 
2. SOLVENTS: Replacement of volatile organic solvents with less hazardous organic 
materials has helped reduce the risk of harm and consequently helped improve the 
inherent safety of many processing operations. Here are a few examples: 
a. Paints: Use of water based paints rather than solvent based paints increases the 
safety of the paint. Earlier harmful solvents such as petroleum distillates, esters 
and glycol ethers. Since solvents mainly evaporate or disintegrate upon 
application, we humans can come in contact with them which can be harmful to 
us. 
 
b. Paint Strippers: Paint strippers are solvent mixtures designed to remove paint 
and other finishes, and also to clean the underlying surface. The principal active 
ingredient is usually dichloromethane, but it also contains other hydrocarbons 
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such as N-Methyl pyrrolidone, dibasic ethers, and organic esters. But these 
components can be hazardous to humans, for example Dichloromethane is a 
toxic chemical due to its high volatility which makes it an acute inhalation 
hazard. Dichloromethane is also metabolized by the body to form carbon 
monoxide which can lead to carbon monoxide poisoning. Due to the toxic 
nature of paint removers alternatives such as Heat Guns have been developed 
which are basically devices that emit a stream of hot air used to dry and strip 
paint, apply heat shrink tubing, apply shrink film, and dry out damp wood etc.  
 
c. Fiber-Glass Boats: Dibasic Esters (DBE) a solvent manufactured by DuPont has 
replaced acetone as a cleaning agent in the manufacture of fiber-glass boats. 
During the manufacture of these boats workers have to clean the equipment to 
avoid resin formation on them. Hence, acetone was used for the cleaning 
process but son health concerns were raised due to worker over-exposure to 
acetone. Also the acetone that evaporated from the manufacturing facilities 
raised the VOC emissions18. VOC’s are precursors of photochemical 
(Tropospheric) ozone creation that leads in turn to smog and related detrimental 
effects on health and the environment. 
 
d. ChloroFluoroCarbons(CFC’s): CFC’s were developed in the early 1900’s under 
the brand name ‘Freon’ which was used primarily as a refrigerants, but was also 
used in fire-fighting and as propellants. Over the years the use of CFC’s 
increased, and was used in the form of blowing agents, propellants in medicinal 
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applications, and degreasing solvents.  Around 1970, scientists Sherry Rowland 
and Mario Molina found out about the harmful effects of CFC’s, and how it was 
a major cause in the depletion of the ozone layer.  CFC’s have a characteristic 
low reactivity which is essential to hazardous nature. CFCs' lack of reactivity 
gives them a lifespan that can exceed 100 years, which enables them to diffuse 
completely into the upper stratosphere leading to ozone depletion. In order to 
combat the rise of CFC levels globally alternatives such as 
HydroChloroFluoroCarbons (HCFC’s) which are less dangerous to the ozone 
but not completely safe. Nowadays, HydroFluoroCarbons (HFCs) are being 
developed, which will replace HCFCs with essentially no ozone destruction.22  
 
3.4 ATTEENUATION   
 
 
 
 
 
PART TO BE HANDED IN BY DIVYA 
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4.  CASE STUDIES 
Now that the concept of inherent safety as well as its underlying principles has been discussed, 
we will now look at some of the biggest engineering disasters through the years, to see how they 
could have been prevented by applying the concept of inherent safety.  
4.1 BHOPAL DISASTER 
Twenty years ago 250,000 people were exposed to toxic chemicals during a catastrophic gas leak 
from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India. The gas in question here is Methyl-Iso-Cyanate (MIC) 
which is very toxic in nature. More than 5000 people died within days. A further 15,000 died in 
the following years. Around 100,000 people are suffering chronic and debilitating illnesses for 
which treatment is largely ineffective (8).  
   On the night of December 23, 1984, a dangerous chemical reaction occurred in the Union 
Carbide factory when a large amount of water got into the MIC storage tank # 610.  This release 
was due to a runaway exothermic reaction involving MIC and water, which led to a major 
increase in the temperature inside the tank to over 200°C (400°F). This forced the emergency 
venting of pressure from the MIC holding tank, releasing a large volume of toxic gases. The 
reaction was sped up by the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines. A large 
amount, about 40 tons of Methyl-Iso-Cyanate (MIC), poured out of the tank for nearly two hours 
and escaped into the air, spreading within eight kilometers downwind, over the city of nearly a 
million people. 
   Sources say that there were a lot of reasons because of which the incident occurred, but nobody 
knows for sure what exactly happened. One of the biggest questions raised against Union 
Carbide was regarding the safety systems in place, in case a disaster such was this was to occur. 
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After detailed investigations it was found that the ‘six’ safety protocols in place were all non-
functional at the time of the accident (1). Below is a list of the six safety systems that failed: 
1. Flare Tower: It was disconnected 
2. Vent Gas Scrubber: It was out of caustic soda and was inadequate for unsafe volume of 
gas 
3. Water Curtain: Not functional because it was designed with inadequate height 
4. Pressure Valve: was found to be leaking 
5. Run Off Tank: Already contained MIC 
6. Mandatory Refrigeration for MIC Unit: Shut down for 3 months to save money 
There were also reports that a ‘jumper line’ was recently installed as a cheap solution to a 
maintenance problem. This line connected a relief valve header to a pressure vent header and 
enabled water from a routine washing operation to pass between the two, on through a pressure 
valve, and into MIC storage tank 610 (1). 
   Looking back at the disaster, it is not difficult to say that making the process inherently safer 
would have caused this disaster to never happen. Even though a lot of processes have associated 
safety systems present, it is always a possibility that the safety system is under maintenance or 
non-functional. Hence the better way to combat such loopholes in safety systems is to make the 
process inherently safer. Union Carbide could have prevented this disaster if they had applied 
some of the recommendation that will be discussed now. 
   As mentioned earlier inherent safety is an approach to accident prevention by minimizing, 
substituting, moderating and simplifying a hazard. To begin with, we can to start by looking for 
alternatives to the biggest contributor to the accident, Methyl-Iso-Cyanate (MIC). MIC is a 
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highly toxic chemical that was an intermediate in the production of Carbaryl. If the concept of 
substitution was applied here, Union Carbide could have used alternative chemicals or even an 
alternative reaction to manufacture Carbaryl. This would have made the process inherently safer 
because hazards levels would be lower as compared to before. Another application of the 
substitution principle involves knowledge about the exothermic nature of the reaction between 
MIC and water. Since, it was known that MIC and water reacted violently to form a toxic gas, 
Union Carbide should have used substances other than water for cleaning purposes, as well for 
safety systems such as water curtains.  
   Another big problem with the accident was the presence of tanks on-site containing large 
amounts of toxic MIC. This is a recipe for disaster because in the event of an incident a huge 
amount of toxic chemical would be exposed to the environment around. Hence, an alternative 
approach would be to implement the concept of minimization, which would require a reduction 
in the amount of unwanted MIC being stored on-site. If only a small amount of the hazard is 
present, the consequences would also be reduced greatly. 
   Applying the concept of moderation to the scenario at hand, Union carbide should have built 
the factor far away from an urban city. This would have led to fewer fatalities once the toxic gas 
began to spread. By constructing the factor right next to a big city, Union Carbide put the lives of 
nearly a million people in jeopardy. Another application of the moderation concept would have 
been to install dikes or bunds of some form to make sure a toxic gas release didn’t get released 
into the surrounding atmosphere.  
   Lastly, by employing the idea of simplification, Union carbide should have designed a reactor 
which could sustain the maximum pressure or temperature during a runaway reaction. This 
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would eliminate the need for multiple safety systems that need maintenance round-the-clock. 
Summing things up, no matter how many secondary safety measures or safety systems are 
present during an accident such as this, the best and most successful risk mitigation process 
would be to make the process and its auxiliary components inherently safer, thereby removing 
any chance of such a disaster of from happening. 
4.2 FLIXBOROUGH DISASTER 
The Flixborough disaster, UK’s largest explosion in the chemical industry, happened on June 
1974 in a plant that produced nylon for Nypro. This accident resulted in 28 fatalities and the 
almost complete destruction of the plant. The incident occurred in the liquid-phase cyclohexane 
oxidation unit of the plant where cyclohexane at 150°C and a pressure of 9 bar was being 
oxidized. This process took place in 6 chain reactors R1 to R6, converting cyclohexane into the 
KA mixture of cyclohexanone and cyclohexanol4,5. Two month earlier, a 20 in pipe was 
introduced into this process to bypass the leaking reactor 5, to form a bridge connecting reactor 4 
to reactor 6 6.  
 
                                Fig. 6: The reactors and the 20-in bypass 
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   Following the investigation, there was a consensus that this new bypass line had ruptured, 
which led to leakage of 50 tons of cyclohexane in a short period of time, almost a minute4. The 
cyclohexane vaporized to produce a vapor cloud which ignited and led to the disastrous 
explosion. A disagreement occurred over the root cause of the rupture, but there were three main 
hypothesis7: 
 Rupture of the bridging assembly because of internal pressure 
 A leak from a bellow at reactor 4 or reactor 6, followed by a minor explosion that led to 
the rupture of the bridging assembly 
 Rupture of an 8 inch distillation pipeline that led to a minor explosion, which ruptured the 
bridging assembly. 
   The poor design of the 20 in bypass and the failure to comply with both safety norms and 
design requirements have been much discussed. Hence, most of the official recommendations 
focused on these operational issues. Although, specific standards and procedures should always 
be practiced on any plant, these were peripheral issues in the Flixborough incident when 
compared to the instantaneous leak of 50 tons of cyclohexane, which tremendously magnified 
the extent of the explosion. In fact, Trevor Kletz has posed several questions4 to understand why 
such a large amount of cyclohexane leaked, and it was found that the large leak was primarily 
caused by the usage of large pipes which were necessary for the 400 ton inventory.  If the 
incident is approached from an inherently safer perspective, the root cause that magnified the 
extent of the explosion is definitely the presence of a large inventory of cylcohexane, and the 
improvements should have be focused on reducing total amount of the hazard.  
23 
 
   How could the risk have been reduced in the event of a leakage, if the concepts of inherent 
safety were used? The reason for the large inventory was the low conversion in the formation of 
the KA mixture; the amount of air, the oxidizing agent, could not be increased to better the yield 
because oxygen would have reached the Limiting Oxygen Concentration which could cause a 
deflagration4,8. The inherently safer approach should combine process engineers and safety 
specialist at the design stage to produce the required product with less inventory8.  
   The usage of pure oxygen instead of air increases the yield which leads to a reduction of the 
inventory of cyclohexane, but the problem with the usage of pure oxygen is that it increases the 
possibility of deflagration because the system will be operating close to Limiting Oxygen 
Concentration. Recent development in this field have shown that if water was added to the 
system with pure oxygen, water could “replace the nitrogen as the inert component and moderate 
the flammability of the cyclohexane/oxygen mixture”6.In fact, water would decrease the 
temperature of the cyclohexane-water mixture and an increase in the vapor pressure compared to 
pure cyclohexane. In addition, the usage of oxygen as the oxidizing agent will give twice more 
product and reduced the inventories8.  In the event of a leakage, vapor cloud formation will still 
form but the cyclohexane amount leaked will be less because of the high yield, the amount of 
cyclohexane that will vaporize is less as well because of the decrease of the system temperature 
and the formation of water vapor will reduce the vapor cloud concentration moving the system 
further from the flammability limits6. 
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4.3 SEVESO ACCIDENT 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The overall safety of a process relies on various layers of protection. The first and most 
important part of this safety blanket is inherent safety. Inherent safety can greatly help reduce the 
risks associated with a certain hazard because it deals with reducing the hazard itself, rather than 
controlling the consequences resulting from the hazard.  
   In today’s world where technology has led to more complex and dangerous process, it is of 
utmost importance that we incorporate the concept of inherent safety into our designs. In order to 
apply these concepts, one has to understand the underlying principles of inherent safety namely:  
Intensification, Minimization, Substitution and Attenuation.  
   By successfully understanding and applying the principles of inherent safety, we can reduce 
the occurrences of huge chemical disasters such as Bhopal, Flixborough and Seveso, that greatly 
impacted the way we perceive safety today. We also need to look back at those disasters, and 
learn from our mistakes, because there a lot to learn from what happened in the past. 
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1. Attenuation 
The use of hazardous materials in their least hazardous forms, or implementing processing options that 
involve less severe processing conditions is called attenuation or moderation techniques1. Hence in the 
case of chlorine and ammonia,  they are  stored as  refrigerated  liquids at atmospheric pressure  rather 
than at high pressure, at ambient temperature. The  lower pressure results  in  lower  leak rates and the 
lower temperature lowers the vaporization rate1. 
Changing designs or process conditions, rather than adding on protective equipment that may fail, limits 
the possible effect of the hazard. For example,  it  is better to prevent overheating by using a fluid at a 
lower temperature rather than use a hotter fluid and relying on a control system2. Therefore application 
of attenuation strategy can significantly lower overall process safety risk.  
Moderation  of process  variables,  like pressure,  velocity or  temperature,  can  also be  considered  as  a 
minimization strategy. Although one is not minimizing a quantity to reduce a hazard but instead, one is 
primarily  minimizing  a  process  quality  to  do  so.  Hence  attenuation  is  effectively  a  procedure  that 
minimizes process variables in order to attain an inherently safer system. 
Furthermore, if all accidents can be expressed as having three components: initiation, propagation and 
termination,  the  inherent  safety  strategy used affects  specific  components2. Generally, whenever  the 
process is made inherently safer by means of impacting the initiator, it is a form of hazard minimization, 
substitution,  or  moderation  of  process  quality2.  However,  when  the  impact  of  an  inherent  safety 
strategy  lessens  the  accident  effect  by  affecting  either  the  propagation  of  the  hazard,  or  the 
consequences experienced at termination, it is an example of the attenuation strategy2. 
The attenuation  strategy can be applied  to many  real  life  situations,  some of which are  listed below. 
Unlike  liquefied gases,  for which pressure and  temperature are  the major process  condition  that are 
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moderated to make them safe, the following example cases delve into other possible process variables 
which might make the process inherently safer. 
1.1. Case of a BLEVE fireball 
The case of a fireball that results from a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) of a tank truck 
containing  large  quantities  flammable  liquid  will  be  analyzed  to  deduce  the  impact  on  a  recipient. 
Exposure  duration  for  the  recipient  is  either  the  fireball  duration  or  the  escape  time,  assuming  the 
recipient  is able to escape from harm’s way2.   The extent of  injury, the recipient will endure,  is mainly 
dependent on  the exposure duration and  the  level of personal protection  the recipient was wearing2. 
From the definition of attenuation strategy it can be implied that anything done to impact the transport 
of radiation from the fireball to the recipient, or to  impact the duration of exposure, or to  impact the 
absorption of  radiation  that  reaches  him would be  an  example  this  strategy.  Therefore  the distance 
between the potential origin of the fireball and a receptor is a process condition that if moderated will 
make the system inherently safer2. Maximizing this distance limits the effects of a fireball on a receptor. 
 
 
 
1.2. Dilution of hazardous material 
Inherent safety can be established by diluting a hazardous material with a less hazardous material. If the 
diluted material is spilled, the partial pressure of the hazardous material will be lower than for the pure 
material3.  This  implies  that  the  concentration of  vapor  at  the  spill will be  reduced  and  consequently 
reducing the downwind concentration in air3.  
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In  the  case  of  a  flammable  material,  dilution  with  a  non‐flammable  material  such  as  water  may 
significantly  reduce  the  fire  hazard3.  In  some  cases,  pure  materials  such  as  hydrogen  chloride  or 
ammonia  may  require  pressurized  storage,  while  relatively  concentrated  aqueous  solutions  can  be 
stored at atmospheric pressure3. Although many applications require the use of a pure material, many 
do  not.  Therefore  such  applications,  for  example  neutralization with  ammonia  or  hydrochloric  acid, 
aqueous materials could be considered3. 
Moreover stability of some solid materials can also be enhanced by dilution with an inert material. The 
dynamite is an example of an inherently safer design as the unstable nitroglycerine is absorbed onto an 
inert carrier3.  
1.3. Case of a Dust Explosion 
The impact of an accident can also be moderated by altering the physical characteristics of a material. In 
the case of dust explosions the hazard of a combustible dust is a function of its particle size3. Increasing 
the  particle  size,  by  handling  these materials  as  granule  or  pellets, will make  the  process  inherently 
safer3.  
Some  reactive or  toxic materials can be  immobilized by attaching  them  to a solid substrate3. This will 
make the toxic particles less likely to come into contact with people, as it will be heavier and will settle. 
For example, acid or basic functionality can be provided as a solid ion exchange resin or a membrane3. 
Metal catalysts are often bonded to an inert carrier3. 
2. Seveso accident 
2.1 Introduction 
On Saturday, 9th of  July1976, a bursting disc ruptured on a chemical reactor at the works of the Icmesa 
Chemical  Company  at  Meda  near  Seveso,  a  town  of  about  17,000  inhabitants  some  15  miles  from 
Milan4. The disk rupture resulted in a release of a white vapor cloud that dispersed and settled. Among 
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the substances deposited was a very small amount of TCDD, 2,3,7,8‐Tetrachlorodibenzo‐p‐dioxin, one of 
the most toxic chemicals known4. After the release of toxic TCDD, there followed a period of confusion 
as  the company was  inexperienced and  ill equipped  to deal with such an accident. Over  the next  few 
days,  animals  died  and  people  fell  ill  in  the  contaminated  area4. Only  a  partial  evacuation was  later 
carried out. In the immediate aftermath there were no deaths directly attributable to the release, but a 
number of pregnant women who had been exposed had abortions4. 
The process which gave rise to the accident was the production of 2,4,5‐trichlorophenol (TCP) in a batch 
reactor4.  TCP  is  used  for  herbicides  and  antiseptic  and  the  company  required  it  for  making  the 
bacteriostatic  agent,  hexachlorophene4.  It  manufactured  its  own  because  the  herbicide  grades 
contained  impurities  unacceptable  in  this  application.  The  formation  of  TCP  involved  two  stages  of 
reaction as illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1: The reaction for the production of TCP4 
Stage  1  of  the  reaction  was  performed  at  170  to  180°C  with  ethylene  glycol  as  solvent  and  on 
completion of this stage, some 50% of the ethylene glycol would be distilled of and the temperature of 
the reaction mixture  lowered to 50 to 60°C by the addition of water4. In this reaction the formation of 
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small quantities of TCDD as a by‐product was unavoidable.  The chemical structure of TCDD is illustrated 
in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: The chemical structure of TCDD4 
At a reaction temperature below153°C, the formation of TCDD is zero, and is less than 1ppm when the 
temperature is 180°C4. However the concentration increases a thousand folds with prolonged heating in 
the temperature range 230 to 260°C to about 1600 ppm4.  
2.2 Properties of TCDD 
TCDD  is one of the most toxic substances known. The  lowest LD50 quoted  is for guinea pigs and  is 0.6 
mg/kg, which  is  a  dose  of  0.6  *10‐9  per  unit  of  body weight4.  TCDD  can  be  taken  into  the  body  by 
ingestion,  inhalation or  skin  contact. A  leading  symptom of TCDD poisoning  is  chloracne, which  is an 
acne‐like skin effect caused by chemicals4. A mild case of chloracne usually clears within a year, but a 
severe case can  last many years. Other effects of TCDD  include skin burns and  rashes and damage  to 
liver, kidney and urinary systems and to the nervous system4.  It also  interferes with metabolic activity 
and  is known to have carcinogenic and mutanegenic properties. TCDD  is a stable solid which  is almost 
insoluble  in water and resistant to destruction by  incineration except at very high temperatures4. This 
make TCDD extremely difficult to dispose. 
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2.3 The accident 
The release was the result of a runaway reaction in reactor causing the rupture of the bursting disk and 
the subsequent release of a vapor cloud. The schematic of the process plant  is shown  in the following 
figure 3. The  release of  the vapor cloud was  from  the  rupture disk as can be  seen  from  the diagram 
below. 
 
Figure 3: The reaction system at Seveso plant4. 
The events prior  to  the accident  involved  the  interruption of  the production  cycle, and allowing  it  to 
overheat over a prolonged period. The stages 1 and 2 of the reaction were switched and the only 15% of 
the ethylene glycol was removed prior to the occurrence of the incident4. The method of distillation was 
not accurately followed. This resulted in higher concentration of TCDD production. Furthermore, the set 
pressure on the bursting disk was high, which allowed the vapor cloud to have higher temperature and 
pressure4. This in turn permitted higher concentrations of TCDD to be discharged. And lastly, there was 
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no  system  installed  for  the  collection or destruction of  the  vented material  and  therefore allowing a 
higher degree of contamination4. 
2.4 Inherent Safety Strategies 
The toxicity of TCDD is closer to that of a chemical warfare agent than to that of the typical toxic 
substance which the chemical industry is used to handling.  Yet it was handled very poorly. In the 
following section the accident will be analyzed with respect to inherent safety strategies and how the 
failure to implement them resulted in the disaster. 
2.41. Minimize 
The process involved the production of TCDD as a by‐product. TCDD’s production could have been 
minimized by reducing the quantity of reactants being processed5. The reactor was charged with over 
7000kgs of reactant and as a result of the runaway reaction caused a rather large vapor cloud.  
2.42. Substitute 
It was known that above 230°C such a mixture, like used in the Seveso plant, will undergo an exothermic 
decomposition reaction. Accidents had been known to occur involving a runaway reaction above this 
temperature. If the reaction was substituted with a less toxic process this disaster could have been 
prevented and the system to produce TCP would have been inherently safer. 
2.43. Attenuation 
The setting of the bursting disc was 3.5 bar. The function of this device was to guard against 
overpressure from the compressed air, which was used to transfer materials to the reactor4. On 
investigating the incident, it was found that if the set pressure had been lower, venting would have 
occurred at a lower, and less hazardous, temperature. And this would have resulted in lower TCDD 
discharge. 
36 
 
Furthermore, as the reaction was known to lead to a runaway reaction above a specified temperature, 
moderating the temperature and pressure values with more care could have prevented the discharge5. 
There were no automated controls and hence moderation of process variables could not be carried out 
efficiently. 
2.44. Simplify 
Proof has been provided of the inadequacy of the measuring equipment and also the absence of any 
automatic control system4. This complicates the system to a great extent. Moreover, operating 
procedures were not clearly mentioned or adhered to which was one of the major reasons of the failure. 
Also the original process required the charge to be acidified before distillation but the company 
reversed these two steps and thereby increasing the complexity of the system. 
2.5. Outcome of the accident 
“The impact of the Seveso disaster in Continental Europe has in some ways exceeded that of 
Flixborough and has led to much greater awareness of process industry hazards on the part of the public 
and demands for more effective controls.”4 As a direct result of the Seveso disaster, the European 
Commission passed a Directive on ‘Major Accident Hazards of 1982’. This Directive was initially often 
referred to as the ‘Seveso Directive’4. Later in 1996, the European Union passed the ‘Seveso II Directive’, 
to control major accident hazards involving hazardous substances4. 
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